hinterlands. Yet the history of the Appalachian Trail has implications that extend well beyond the corridor's narrow boundaries. The acquisition of land for the corridor in the late 1970s and early 1980s relied on a dynamic interplay of power and authority between a wide range of public and private interests.
The project was supported by southern Baptist ministers and MIT professors, postal clerks, and American presidents. At the same time, the project was resisted by chicken farmers and property rights advocates, land developers and libertarians. The social struggles and political alliances that occurred in reaction to economic, political, and environmental change are as much a part of this recreational landscape as the thin, terrestrial strip that it protects.
Because of the countless number of hours volunteers have worked on the trail since its conception in 1921, the trail is commonly referred to as "the people's An exploration of efforts to protect the Appalachian Trail corridor in the late twentieth century provides deeper understandings of the complex relationship between centralized state-based conservation efforts and decentralized grass roots social action. It forces us to reexamine how we understand the categories of "public" and "private," not just in terms of how they define ownership bound aries, but also in terms of how power dynamics associated with these categories function in political debates about the control of land and resources. This essay deeper understanding of underlying power dynamics involved in large-scale conservation initiatives in the late twentieth century. As political and financial support for large-scale federal land acquisition programs diminished in the 1980s, the public-private partnership model for protecting land and resources emerged.3 These institutional links were built on strong cooperative relation ships that were tested by a range of resistance. Citizen engagement in large-scale conservation projects like the Appalachian Trail took the forms of leadership and support as well as organized opposition. Like the Appalachian Trail itself, the path toward public-private partnership was long and tortuous.
By revealing power as a dynamic interaction between disparate, sometimes antagonistic groups, the story of the Appalachian Trail helps us understand con flict and negotiation as essential processes in the historical shift toward public private partnership.
"SQUIRREL TRACK" TO NATIONAL TRAILS ACT Many environmental historians are familiar with the origins of the Appalachian Trail; less is known about the complicated land acquisition program created to protect the corridor in the late 1970s and 1980s. 4 In 1921, Progressive forester Benton MacKaye envisioned a two-thousand-mile footpath that would stretch from Georgia to Maine. The footpath was part of a broader project in regional planning that linked a series of local communities dedicated to small-scale forestry and farming. The initial purpose of the Appalachian Trail was to provide jobs for rural workers, opportunities for spiritual and physical health for an expanding urban population, and land protection from profit-motivated exploiters.5 Although MacKaye proposed that government experts like himself would be involved in designing and coordinating the project, he believed that the Appalachian Trail would ultimately rely on the local knowledge of citizen volunteers and workers.
For MacKaye, there were two different types of footpaths. One was outside the range of motor sounds and made by "amateur walkers "-a "squirrel track" type.
The other type of trail was within the zone of motor sounds and created by government labor-a "graded type."6 MacKaye explained this distinction in an argument with Myron Avery, a naval lawyer from Maine who did more actual con struction and promotion of the trail than any other single individual in the pro ject's history. In the early 1930s, MacKaye and Avery had a notorious falling-out over the future of trail development. Their argument was not only about the trail's relationship with roads and scenic drives, as eloquently explained by historian Paul Sutter, but also about the political processes by which the trail was to be built.7 Avery favored stronger federal involvement while MacKaye emphasized a more decentralized, loosely-structured grassroots approach that would be gently supported by a benevolent government. By the 1920s and 1930s, hiking clubs had developed strong roots throughout New England, and trail aficionados embraced MacKaye's plan for a long-distance trail.8 In their effort to create a continuous path from Georgia to Maine, however, they left MacKaye's plans for social and economic reform by the wayside.9 Led by Myron Avery, the Appalachian Trail Conference grew as an umbrella organization for an extended network of influential outdoor enthusiasts and local hiking clubs. The organization succeeded in blazing an initial two-thousand-mile route by 1937. On public lands, particularly in the southern national forests, To facilitate the expansion of the national park system, the park service implemented a series of "get tough" policies in 1977. These policies emerged out of a growing concern about the rising costs of scenic land. As demand for vacation homes, ski resorts, and other types of private development increased in the late 1970s, many conservationists and officers within the park service perceived the need to take a more aggressive approach to land acquisition. 15 The "get tough" acquisition policies primarily applied to inholdings within existing parks. An example of one of these policies was a provision that gave the park service the power to condemn a property if a park inholder attempted to improve or develop a structure on an unimproved property. Such action would prevent the agency from having to pay for the increased property value at a later date. 16 The "get tough" policies of the late 1970s hastened acquisition processes and expedited the use of eminent domain in park projects around the country. 17 In the agency's attempt to bring parks to the people, the park service's acqui sition programs spurred an unprecedented degree of cooperation between public and private agents in the late 1970s. It also caused a great deal of conflict and resistance among landowners. For example, in 1978, an article in Newsweek described the story of Herb Van Deven, a schoolteacher in Arkansas who had moved to the banks of the Buffalo River in the Ozark Mountains. Along with several neighbors, Van Deven fought the park service's plans to create the Buffalo National River. Landowners like Van Deven claimed that such efforts were a violation of individual property rights, and they complained about "annoy ing telephone calls from park officials ... late-night visits from government land acquisition officers, and ... strong-arm tactics."18 Van Deven's statement reveals that efforts to expand and improve parks and recreation areas in the 1970s were matched by growing concerns among many citizens who believed that the park service used unfair and aggressive tactics to implement policies that infringed on private property rights.
Landowners' opposition to federal land acquisition programs in the East was not a new phenomenon, but it differed from earlier resistance in several key ways. Because of efforts to acquire land for the Great Smoky Mountain National Park and the Shenandoah National Park in the 1930s, mountain residents were required to leave their homes. In the case of Shenandoah, many of the residents were subsistence farmers who did not necessarily own land outright. These poor mountain farmers lacked the resources to organize opposition to the park service. 19 Many who did own property were willing to sell their land, and some were even grateful for the opportunity to sell after several years of drought and a decline in soil fertility in the early 1930s. Unlike earlier federal initiatives to acquire land, in some areas, resistance to park acquisition in the 1970s was fueled by a larger growing concern about the expanding power of the federal government and its infringement on civil liberties-particularly in relation to property rights. Also, after a couple of decades of covering civil rights protests, the media had become adept at reporting stories about everyday citizens struggling with large centralized power. Despite the growing demand for public recreational spaces, national coverage in newspapers and other media outlets helped those who opposed park acquisition programs gain public support. Leaders of the fledgling property rights movement used the media and the tactics of grassroots organization that evolved in the 1960s to organize against the park service's land acquisition programs. In a concerted attempt to defend property rights against National Park Service's land acquisition programs, Charles S. Cushman, a landowner within the borders of Yosemite National Park, organized the National Park Inholders Association in 1978.20 Cushman believed that federal acquisition programs in late 1970s were no longer subject to "any checks and balances."
In his view, the park service had "leaned over backwards to accommodate the environmentalists" and had become "arrogant and cavalier" when dealing with inholders.21 In 1978, Cushman traveled around the country to meet with landowners and to bring national media attention to the stories of property owners who had been affected by the shift in park policy and land acquisition tactics. These stories caused concern for Appalachian Trail project partici pants-citizen volunteers, landowners, and public officials alike.
Most trail volunteers were grateful for greater federal support, and they rea lized that many sections of the trail would have been lost without federal inter vention. Yet the park service's new, tougher policies and the potential use of eminent domain concerned many long-time trail advocates. Also, the formal bureaucratic nature and somewhat paternalistic structure of the park service differed from the loose, informal processes that had historically characterized relationships between the Appalachian Trail Conference and its local club affili ates. For example, after Congress passed the 1968 Trails Act, new laws required that all relocations of the Appalachian Trail had to be reviewed and approved by the park service. These regulations tended to delay trail managing activities and frustrated long-time volunteers who had cultivated strong relationships with local landowners. In 1977, after spending "countless hours" with one dis gruntled landowner in Vermont who wanted the trail relocated to a different Outing Club. They wrote to Jette that the removal of the trail from their land was "simply a protest against the National Park Service, the Congress, and the federal government for their attempt to destroy a long-standing partnership between the landowner and the hiker." The landowners maintained that "if the National Park Service would be flexible and innovative instead of rigid and reac tionary in its approach," the forty-year-old partnership that existed between the landowners and the trail community could continue.23 Such exchanges became increasingly common, as landowners were given no assurances that condemna tion would not be used on their land. Looking to avoid confrontation with the federal government altogether, some owners decided to act preemptively and removed the trail from their lands.
Initial concerns about reactions to the park service's acquisition program caused the agency to proceed cautiously with its plans to protect the corridor and to reevaluate carefully the acquisition process. Because of the trail's unique geography and its close proximity to settled areas, the Appalachian Trail required a different approach to land acquisition and protection than the aggressive, top-down approaches the park service had previously used to acquire inholdings in existing parks or new units within the national park system. Instead of relying on a strictly top-down approach, the agency involved private citizens and long-time volunteers in nearly every stage of the acquisition program. The scale and intensity at which private citizens were involved in the land acquisition program for the Appalachian Trail were unprecedented. The agency hoped that con tinuing the project's history of grassroots involvement would prevent smoldering sparks of opposition from igniting. Park officials also hoped that citizen involve ment would reduce the costs of the acquisition process and improve the efficiency of the program. In the process, coordinated efforts between members of the Appalachian Trail Conference and the park service helped to forge a new approach to land conservation-public-private partnership based on interdependent sources of power and authority. This path toward public-private partnership was fraught with both conflict and surprising alliances.
ACQUIRING THE CORRIDOR
The primary purpose of the park service's land acquisition program for the Appalachian Trail was to relocate sections of the trail that were being threatened by roads or other developments. Unlike traditional efforts to deter mine park boundaries, where an outer ring drawn on a map designated the border of property to be acquired and the park service's job was to then fill in the circle, the design of the Appalachian Trail corridor was more flexible, in terms of both the tools employed by the agency's real estate experts and the processes by which the agency pursued acquisition. By maintaining this flexi bility in the face of conflict and through the process of negotiation, the Park Service, the Appalachian Trail Conference, and their partners were able to create a 2,175-mile space that succeeded in meeting the needs and desires of local places while simultaneously promoting a large national agenda.
To determine the corridor's boundaries after the 1968 Trails Act, the park service hired professional aerial photographers to fly over the trail and to take pictures of the large, white plastic panels that volunteers had dragged out to the woods and placed along the existing route. These images provided the basis of an official state-by-state map of the Appalachian Trail that was pub and landowners' attitudes towards the project. In many cases, if one owner didn't want the trail on her property, there were usually neighbors nearby who were willing to sell land or a right-of-way easement. As a result, the trail would shift to an adjacent property. Roughly following the center-line survey, the flex ible design of the corridor was an attempt to adapt to local landscapes and land owners' desires-to locate the footpath along the path of least resistance. The park service used several legal tools to acquire land for the trail, includ ing simple fee acquisition, easements, exchanges, donations, and eminent domain. The purpose of having a variety of options was not only to reduce costs for the program, but also to provide flexibility with landowners; thus, to maintain positive relations with local communities along the trail. The pur chase of easements was one of the most commonly used tools in the acquisition of the Appalachian Trail corridor. Typically, an easement would limit public rec reational activity to a narrow right-of-way, and most of the land in the broader corridor would still be owned and controlled by the landowner, with only minor restrictions on land use. Park officials avoided using a standardized easement document for all cases and instead tried to tailor agreements to meet the par ticular desires of landowners. 25 The park service's Appalachian Trail project manager, David Richie, explained that the wording of easements was often intentionally vague. He wrote, "Words like 'good and accepted' are designated to allow for evolution in acceptable practices rather than to fix restrictions accord ing to current practices_They are intended to avoid red tape. Basically, we have tried to devise an easement that is no more restrictive on landowners than is necessary to provide for the Trail and to avoid incompatible development close to it."26
The use of easements during the Appalachian Trail acquisition program was particularly effective because it meant that conserving corridor lands did not necessarily eliminate all forms of economic production. In some areas, easements were designed to promote certain land uses that would "preserve an attractive setting for the Trail."27 For example, when farmers in Pennsylvania's Cumberland Valley expressed concern about the "possible expro priation of farmland by bureaucrats in a $90 million dollar attempt to soothe the aesthetic sense of the three hundred or so individuals who hike the whole trail," Appalachian Trail advocates emphasized that certain farm practices, including the use of farm equipment, herbicides, and other activities necessary to keep farms productive and competitive, would be allowed to continue.28
According to the 1981 Management Plan for the Appalachian Trail, agricultural use of corridor lands that conserved "pastoral scenery" was "not only compati ble, but desirable," as were certain forms of timber harvesting.29 In this way, protective easements played a key role in maintaining flexibility and adapting to landowner's needs and desires.
The most controversial tool that the park service had the authority to use was the power of eminent domain. Condemnation proceedings rarely occurred, however. When they did, it was usually for the purpose of clearing title or estab lishing just compensation. Condemnation was unappealing to the park service not only because of the public uproar it created, but because it was expensive, time consuming, and tedious. In other park acquisition programs, the agency often had the ability to wait the three to five years it took to settle condemna tion proceedings. According to the 1978 amendments, however, the acquisition of the Appalachian Trail corridor lands was to be completed in three years. Furthermore, while waiting for one condemnation proceeding to settle in court, adjacent tracts could become unusable as neighboring landowners sold, logged, or developed their land. Such actions on adjacent parcels would lead to missing links along the route and render the acquisition of the con demned property obsolete. Because of the trail's long, slender shape, acqui sition of one property was often contingent on the successful negotiation of a neighbor's property. Condemnation was good neither for maintaining land owner relations nor for the logistics of time and finance. When it was used, physical, budgetary, social, and political sacrifices were made. 30 Even though eminent domain was not used frequently, in a way the federal authority that it embodied represented the antithesis of the informal, hand shake agreements that had established the footpath in the 1930s. Some land owners perceived the prospect of condemnation as an unwarranted threat to The letter was short and somewhat curt, and it seemed to indicate that the federal government had already selected a final route and was going to establish it regardless of local opinion.
Griggs's cavalier approach caused a major upset with the landowners, and local media were quick to sensationalize the story. An article in the Carlisle Evening Sentinel characterized Griggs's attitude as being "We don't give a damn what you think or what you have. We're going to take what we want."37
One landowner recalled that she would never forget Mr. Griggs and the way he presented himself-"It was like, 'here comes Big Brother comin' in to take your property.'"38 While Griggs, who received no compensation for his efforts in the valley, perceived his work as a benevolent act serving the greater interests of society, landowners who had no history with the project-and who may have mistaken Griggs as a park service official-perceived the initiative as a threat to their personal property rights. Although he was not a public agent, as an outsider to the community, Griggs wielded a kind of authority that was perceived as equally threatening to local landowners. Even though thirty-one of the fifty-four landowners who responded to Griggs's letter said that they would be willing to sell land or easements, Griggs's approach-or at least the way it was portrayed in the media and perceived by members of the local com munity-seemed to create an inhospitable climate for future negotiations.
As Although the park service attempted to alleviate the concerns of landowners and those who sympathized with them about the acquisition program, their con cerns were often more effectively addressed when messages came from private landowners in other communities along the trail who had experienced similar situations. In this sense, the power of persuasion was rooted not in the expertise of the centralized state, but in the shared experience of everyday citizens. At a heated public meeting in Cumberland County, trail advocates shared a letter from a New Hampshire farmer. The letter explained how one of Hanover's last remaining farms had been protected through the combined efforts of the park service, trail volunteers, and concerned landowners. Instead of having federal officials tell local residents the benefits that they would reap by having the trail rerouted through their community, the message was often more powerful when it came from neighbors, fellow residents, or private citizens in similar situations. Using success stories from other communities along the trail was an important way that advocates sought to localize this national project. 45 Appealing to other local residents' desires for protected open space also helped trail advocates overcome landowners' resistance to the acquisition program. Local conservationists who lived in a particular area but were not necessarily hikers played an important role in shaping local opinion toward the project. For example, when Mrs. Laurence Benander learned that the Cumberland County commissioners were resisting plans to relocate the trail through her county, she wrote a letter to the editor of the Harrisburg Patriot News. Benander stated, "[T]he federal government seems ready, willing, and able to spend approximately 6.6 million dollars in our county to preserve some green space for us. I cannot believe that my elected county commis sioners ... actually intend to reject this stroke of good luck."46 She was con cerned about the county's rapid development and argued for stronger protection of the area's natural resources, including the county's rich agricul tural land. Benander pointed out that farming was much more compatible with the Appalachian Trail than industrial development, and she predicted that in a few years, landowners "who currently claim to be preserving their lands for agricultural use will... be seen selling it to developers for large but temporary profits which will eventually cost the rest of us in terms of pollution, higher school taxes, and a lower quality of life. Although there had been a few controversial areas along the trail, in general, the park service viewed the Appalachian Trail acquisition program as a major success and sought ways to continue its strong partnership with the Appalachian Trail Conference. In 1984, the park service delegated the manage rial responsibility of the total seventy thousand acres of land to be acquired to its nonprofit partner organization. 50 The delegation of authority included the management responsibility for all corridor lands outside of existing public areas-about 30 percent of the entire trail. Under the new arrangement, the Appalachian Trail Conference would maintain the trail and shelters, monitor the corridor boundaries, and work with the trust to raise private funds for additional acquisitions. The park service would maintain legal authority for acquired properties. The agency would also be responsible for initially surveying the corridor boundaries, removing existing structures, ensuring NEPA compliance on any major relocation, budgeting federal dollars, and coordinating law enforcement efforts.51 Thus, the park service would primarily perform legal and federal administrative functions, while the Appalachian Trail Conference and its local club affiliates would be responsible for on-the ground management and administration as well as the development of creative new programs to protect the corridor.52
As the Appalachian Trail Conference began to take on its new responsibil ities as a land managing agency, it again relied on the knowledge and experi ence of long-time trail workers while also learning new forms of expertise from its government partners. Through this exchange, the boundaries between public and private continued their often blurry existence. In addition to being responsible for blazing and maintaining a thin trail through the woods, employees and volunteers with the Appalachian Trail Conference learned how to assess resource impacts and prioritize land management initiat ives. The conference also became more skilled in raising funds and working with members of adjacent communities to protect and manage corridor lands. During the 1980s and 1990s, the organization became proficient in certain functions that were once the domain of federal land managing agencies like the park service. In doing so, the organization became a powerful force in the national conservation arena, and in 2005 the Appalachian Trail Conference changed its name to Appalachian Trail Conservancy to reflect the organization's commitment to broader land protection goals.
Since the 1990s, the Appalachian Trail corridor has not only proved to be an important biological resource for wildlife, water quality, and land health, it has become an economic asset to rural communities and a conduit for community planning initiatives. As traditional natural resource industries began to decline Initiatives like the Cumberland Valley Gateway Community Forum also reveal that, in a sense, the Appalachian Trail has come full circle. After almost ninety years since Benton MacKaye proposed his vision for Appalachian Trail as a project in regional planning, the trail is beginning to address some of the broader themes in MacKaye's original plan: the protection of natural resources and the promotion of economic sustainability, health, and quality of life.54 Like other stages in the Appalachian Trail's past, these goals will most likely reach fruition by combining the horizontal, dendritic roots of grassroots social action with a strong central tap root of state support. Like other large-scale land protection efforts, the management and conservation of the Appalachian Trail corridor will not solely depend on federal bureauc racies, but will build on the dynamic interaction among a wide range of interests and the coordinated efforts of both public and private agents. groups. Power and authority between groups were often relationally defined, and the boundaries between the categories "public" and "private"-and the related categories of "amateur" and "expert"-frequently blurred during processes of conflict, cooperation, and negotiation. By demonstrating how power operated as a relational force among disparate groups, the story of the Appalachian Trail challenges old public-private dichotomies and exemplifies new ways of approaching and using authority. Taking the adaptive, hybrid approach associated with public-private partnerships like the Appalachian Trail may be the surest path to protecting the resources we rely on, and the landscapes that we love.
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